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Semantic Flexibility and Grounded Language Learning
Stephen McGregor 1 and Thierry Poibeau 1
Abstract. We explore the way that the flexibility inherent in the
lexicon might be incorporated into the process by which an envi-
ronmentally grounded artificial agent – a robot – acquires language.
We take flexibility to indicate not only many-to-many mappings be-
tween words and extensions, but also the way that word meaning is
specified in the context of a particular situation in the world. Our hy-
pothesis is that embodiment and embededness are necessary condi-
tions for the development of semantic representations that exhibit this
flexibility. We examine this hypothesis by first very briefly review-
ing work to date in the domain of grounded language learning, and
then proposing two research objectives: 1) the incorporation of high-
dimensional semantic representations that permit context-specific
projections, and 2) an exploration of ways in which non-humanoid
robots might exhibit language-learning capacities. We suggest that
the experimental programme implicated by this theoretical investiga-
tion could be situated broadly within the enactivist paradigm, which
approaches cognition from the perspective of agents emerging in the
course of dynamic entanglements within an environment.
1 Introduction
In the early 20th Century, Russell [57] performed a famous thought
experiment involving a proposition about the baldness of the King of
France. The object of this exercise was not actually regal coiffure;
the point was that there was in fact no King of France at the time,
and so the philosopher had attributed a measurable characteristic to
a non-existent entity, rendering the truth-value of the statement am-
biguous. The outcome of Russell’s reflections was the inception of
a programme designed to translate the vagaries of natural language
as used by humans into a rigorously rule-bound system of logical
expressions and a corresponding algebra of truth.
But several decades of cognitive linguistic and pragmatic theory
and experimentation have given the lie to the idea that language
is just a construct for conveying veridical propositions about the
world [16, 23]. Psychological studies and mounting neurolinguistic
research suggest that the interpretation of non-literal language is en-
tangled with, and in some cases equivalent to, the processing of lit-
eral statements, and, moreover, that the context in which both figura-
tive and literal language is encountered plays an important role in its
processing [52]. It is evident that natural language is, in a very fun-
damental way, not simply about situations in the world; it is, rather,
characterised by flexibility in terms of how it is applied in the course
of agents attempting to achieve communicative goals, and as a con-
sequence words very often do not explicitly denote in the way that
Russell had hoped could be formalised [6].
The essentiality of non-literalness in natural language poses an
interesting question for researchers interested in developing linguis-
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tically capable robots, or for that matter in using robots to study the
way in which humans use language: how do lexical semantic repre-
sentations grounded in an agent’s experience of the world and inter-
action with other agents gain their fundamental flexibility? A general,
and not unreasonable, assumption has been that robots learn first and
foremost to ground words literally, in their experience of objects and
actions in the world. But how do the representations learned in this
way obtain the looseness and ambiguity that is ubiquitous to lan-
guage in use [62]? This flexibility is, importantly, evident not only
in more overt phenomena such as metaphor (which itself occupies a
range from conventional to jarringly novel or even poetic), but more
subtle phenomena such as image schemas [35, 33] and semantic type
coercion [51, 15].
So, for instance, the way that human communicants quite natu-
rally produce and interpret a sentence such as “I finished the book”
actually imposes a mismatch between the argument type expected by
the predicate finished, which invites an event in the objective posi-
tion, and the type offered by the object book, which is a substantial
thing. Similarly, the application of the verb open is itself remark-
ably open-ended: we can talk about “opening a package”, “opening
a door”, “opening a shop”, and so forth, all without in any obvious
way transgressing the literal. How can we expect an agent that has
acquired potentially quite specifically structured semantic represen-
tations for such actions and objects from basic encounters with them
in the world to develop the architecture to seamlessly project from
one categorical or conceptual domain to another? The way that lan-
guage is actually observed in use threatens to perpetually confound
any systematic attempt to map from structured symbolic representa-
tions of words to the type of actionable interpretations of sentences
that we might hope to apply to the operations of an artificial agent.
Because of its role in the construction and transmission of con-
cepts, language is often afforded a special status among cognitive
phenomena, sometimes even presented as a kind of manifestation of
thought itself [25]. In this paper, though, in line with a relevance the-
oretical account of the despecialisation of language [74], we seek to
situate language on the same level as other behaviours exhibited by
cognitive agents in the course of their interactions with environments
and communities. In order to do this, we turn to Gibson’s [30] notion
of affordance, which we take to be the direct, non-representational
perception of opportunities for action in an environment, and apply
the same thinking that pertains to other objects to the lexical units of
language. So, just as an agent can perceive a newspaper as something
that affords the opportunity to swat a fly in a certain context, we ar-
gue that the lexicon should be perceived directly as an opportunity
for communicating, and that words are picked up, used, and received
by communicants in the same open-ended way.
Starting from this premise, we propose three desiderata for devel-
oping artificial language-using agents:
1. Lexical semantic units should be flexible from the ground up;
2. Semantic flexibility should arise from environmental entangle-
ment and be built into the structure of semantic representations
themselves;
3. These representations should permit environmentally triggered
projection into context-specific subspaces.
What follows is a position paper exploring the grounds for these stip-
ulations, the ways in which they might be implemented, and some of
the implications of such implementations. The next two sections of-
fer a very cursory review of the current state of the art in terms of
models of the emergence of semantics from multi-agent interactions
and research investigating the way that embodied agents might ac-
quire language in the real world. This review serves as the motivation
for two ideas for the direction of future research in this area.
2 Language Learning and Interaction
The idea of language as an act of meaning-making has served
as the theoretical basis for an entire field of productive empirical
projects investigating the emergence of semantics through interac-
tions between agents communicating in an environment [66]. Work
in this area has typically entailed experiments involving simulations
of agents interacting in environments in which the emergence of
communication provides a fitness advantage to either individuals or
groups. As such, the theoretical grounding for this research has often
incorporated the modelling of various components of the evolution
of language [61].
An evolutionary approach to the emergence of language has lent
itself to a consideration of how natural language, with its syntax2
and corresponding open-endedness, might arise from the dynamics
of more basic signalling phenomena [63]. Franke and Jäger [26] de-
scribe a model for coordinating expressions and interpretations be-
tween two communicants through language games grounded in the
application of optimality theory [50] to signal interpretation, push-
ing multi-agent simulations into the realm of truth conditions and
implicature. No assumptions are made here about the basis for con-
structing, broadcasting, and receiving signals, however, so this work
does not provide, and is not intended to provide, an experimental ba-
sis for the semiotic processes by which units of language gain their
compositional potential [28].
Lazaridou et al. [37] describe a model that involves pairs of agents
playing language games in a simulated environment: the agents at-
tempt to come to a consensus on semantic representations for both
abstract objects represented as collections of categorical features
(such as shape and colour) and real-world static images of objects.
Compellingly, the authors illustrate how the representational systems
that emerge in the course of their agents’ interactions contain ele-
ments of compositionality. So, for instance, their agents learn to con-
sistently apply a certain semantic component when converging on
names for various green objects in the abstract version of the exper-
iment. In a related experiment, through a clever interpolation of an
independent image classification task with the joint naming task, the
same authors show that their agents have a propensity for mapping
symbols associated with one image class to the naming of a related
task, using the same symbols in, for instance, identifying a picture of
open water with a symbol used in the classification of a picture of a
dolphin [38].
2 There is an impressive body of work exploring, theoretically and empiri-
cally, emergentist models of grammar [65, 32]; here, we focus on the emer-
gence of semantic flexibility.
It is important to note, however, that the basis of these seman-
tic units are arbitrarily abstract. In the implementations described
by Lazaridou et al., a representation for an object is composed of
a sequence of integers, drawn from a vocabulary grounded simply
in the pseudo-randomness of a computer simulation of a stochastic
process. The semiotics of these representations are at best obscure;
the open-ended compositionality of the symbols is an extrapolation
of categorical structure that is inherent in the virtual environment, in
the behaviour of the linguistic community, or in the pre-established
cognitive architecture of an individual agent [67].
Because the interpretations associated with representations and the
way in which those representations stand for things in the world are
dissociated, there is little chance for a community of agents using
this type of emergent but also abstract language to capture the lex-
ical flexibility that is an essential component of natural language.
As a case in point, linguists have noted the way that perception in
general can be applied metaphorically to more abstract cognitive ex-
periences, and moreover the way that certain modes of perception
tend, at least within certain cultures and families of languages, to
be reliably applied to certain metaphoric targets [56, 69]. Cogni-
tive linguists have accordingly postulated a link between loose - in
particular, metaphoric - lexical semantics and corresponding cogni-
tive flexibility [36, 29]. It is unclear, however, and, we argue, un-
likely that agents will through abstract interactions arrive at repre-
sentational frameworks that facilitate mappings from, for instance,
COLOUR to AFFECT if the representations themselves are not in some
sense grounded in the specific mechanics of the way that the agent
actually physically, bodily interacts with its environment.
It would be misleading to suggest that these experiments on the
emergence of language through multi-agent interactions are per-
formed in an entirely disembodied manner. There is often an explicit
acknowledgement of the significance that the particular biology of
an agent plays in language grounding. In practice, though, this envi-
ronmental grounding is typically realised through the presentation of
data that is in some very general sense in-the-world, so for instance
the presentation of photographs of objects as part of a naming game.
In these cases, the embodiment itself is presumed to be captured in
the nature of the way that the agent passively processes the raw data,
and the connection between the agent and the world becomes ob-
scured by the opacity and abstractness of dense image processing
networks.
We propose that physical embodiment and a corresponding model
of semiotics that is grounded in the body and the environment of an
agent is a necessary condition for generating the type of semantic
representations that exhibit the flexibility of application that natural
language exhibits universally and at the most basic level. In the next
section, we will briefly review the state of the art of work with lan-
guage learning robots and consider ways in which these machines
might be used to capture the emergence of flexible semantic repre-
sentations through interaction with an environment.
3 Language Learning and Embodiment
In a concise and informative survey of recent work in teaching robots
abstract concepts and corresponding language, Cangelosi and Stra-
mandinoli [10] postulate that lexical flexibility is achieved through
a combination of embodied symbol grounding, transferal between
grounded conceptual domains, and the interaction of language use
and physical action. Early work in this area involved simulated robots
learning to imitate actions and then combine these actions into novel
routines in response to compound commands, using neural networks
to model the way that sensorimotor processes can map to represen-
tations that have very basic properties of, if not compositionality, at
least concatenation [9]. Subsequent experiments have explored the
way that the actual bodies of simulated robots can play a role in learn-
ing action-oriented linguistic activities such as counting: De La Cruz
et al. [19] demonstrate that coupling sequences of spoken numbers
with sequential finger counting during training greatly strengthens a
simulated robot’s ability to accurately count.
A primary motivation for at least some linguistic experiments on
robots has been to study the valid question of how noisy and unpre-
dictable environments impact various models of symbol grounding
[68]. An assortment of robots [27, 41] and corresponding platforms
for running virtual simulations have proven valuable tools for ex-
ploring the way that an artificial agent interacts with its environment
in the course of language learning, and the ways that environmental
factors can both support and confound the learning process. An open
question, though, is whether or not these simulations, or for that mat-
ter the robots themselves, achieve the level of abstraction necessary
to capture the way in which an agent’s physiognomy interacts with
its environment in order to generate semantic representations with
the flexibility inherent in natural language.3 The idea of associating
both sequences of actions and labels with underlying cognitive archi-
tectures seems well motivated and is an excellent starting point, but
the actual way of being in the world that characterises the agent, the
mechanisms of its action and the way that these mechanisms came to
exist, are grounded out at a lower level of engineering decisions and
corresponding hardware.
Hernández et al. [31], in their neuroanatomically inspired ap-
proach to grounding robotic language learning through visual stim-
uli, use both simulated and real robots but constrain their robots to
maintain a static field of vision. This is a move to simplify input to
an information processing architecture which is already, by design,
complex; the purpose of the research described by those authors is
in large part to explore ways that language-learning robots can be
used to study the brain. That said, it is a move that is made at the
expense of the idea that vision, and indeed all perception, depends
on the activation of sensorimotor contingencies that make the expe-
rience of perceiving an active process of environmental engagement
[44]. According to the sensorimotor account, it is through these con-
tingencies that perceptions acquire their actual feel, and so, arguably,
the basis for forming a complex representational framework for con-
ceptualising the experience of being in the world.4 The idea is that
an agent perceives a situation in an environment based not merely on
a passive analysis of the data available to its sensors, but from an un-
folding engagement with the environment involving the coupling of
sensors with actuators to such an extent that the distinction becomes
blurred [43].
Working off of this account, and more generally from the enac-
tivist standpoint on the emergence of representation as an outcome
of the evolution of self-perpetuating, self-replicating processes in a
complex environment [39, 70], we might conclude that an agent that
is not participating in its environment is not really learning anything
at all. Returning to the theme addressed in Section 2, we propose that,
if linguistic flexibility is to be an essential component of a system of
lexical semantic representations, then the representations must be in
3 Wittgenstein [75] describes “the familiar physiognomy of a word, the feel-
ing that it has taken up its meaning into itself,” (p. 218).
4 O’Regan [45] has argued that sensorimotor contingencies can actually ac-
count for phenomenal consciousness, a claim which is outside the scope of
the current paper, though it is worth noting that metaphoric language is ar-
guably a prerequisite for conceptualising the experience of having a mind,
or, to put it differently, for constructing concepts about concepts [3, 40].
fact products of an agent’s actions, rather than just abstractly mapped
to them. Because we require our semantic representations to be struc-
turally flexible, we propose it is necessary to consider before all else
the way this flexibility will be instantiated in our agent’s architecture,
and the type of in-the-world agent we need in order to achieve this
flexibility in the course of interaction with an environment.
4 Modelling Lexical Flexibility
Practically speaking, it is important to note that the idea of flexi-
bility in semantic representations has, broadly, been considered in
some existing work. Wellens et al. [73], for instance, describe a set
of grounded language learning experiments that explicitly target lin-
guistic flexibility, albeit conducted with humanoid robots. The re-
sults of these experiments are compelling, but it is important to note
that the concept of flexibility employed by those authors is related to
but distinct from the one we are considering: where they are inter-
ested in the way that agents learn to map from potentially ambiguous
intensional properties to potentially ambiguous extensional denota-
tions, we are interested in the way that semantic representations can
be contextually adapted in the process of constructing ad hoc con-
cepts [11, 1]. Rather than presume that the agents that we would like
to model have a developed conceptual framework ready for lexical
semantic enhancement – in other words, have in some sense pre-
formulated internal representations – we propose to explore the way
in which representations themselves might come about as a result of
having a physiognomy in an environmental situation.
In order to open up a consideration of the way in which grounded
agents might acquire lexical semantic representations that are flexi-
ble from the ground up, we begin by adopting Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi
et al.’s [55] proposal to re-imagine the symbol grounding problem as
a symbol ungrounding problem. This is effectively a call to take seri-
ously the situated semiotics of the way that agents acquire their lin-
guistic representations, and to consider language itself as a physically
bounded system of replicable constraints [53]. Under this premise,
linguistic development begins with the experience of very basic inter-
personal communications in the environment of an early-stage lan-
guage learner. These communications, as percepts in the learner’s
environment, are associated with affordances, or direct opportunities
for action [30]. The things afforded by these primal communications
are not necessarily associated with truth-values; they can instead be
mapped to the sense of, for instance, mutual attention to one another
that is an important element of early-life interactions, followed by
a pushing-out into experiences of shared attention to objects in the
world [54].
The process by which these early experiences of proto-linguistic
communication solidify into a system of representational, compo-
sitional, and, importantly, flexible symbols lines up with the phe-
nomenon of ontogenetic ritualisation as described by Spranger and
Steels [64]. Those authors describe the way that the action of an in-
fant reaching for but failing to obtain an object gradually develops
into the ubiquitous communicative gesture of pointing to indicate the
desire to have that object. This is an example of the way that the envi-
ronment, its affordances, and the physical capacities and constraints
of an agent become the semiotic basis for an emergent representation.
Spranger and Steels perform an experiment involving a real robot in
which they make the case that a learner robot develops a reaching
gesture as a symbol for signalling a tutor robot to push a distant ob-
ject towards them.
We would like to suggest that an agent’s lexicon could materialise
in a similar way. What begin as basic patterns of signals deployed
simply to attract attention might evolve into more complex represen-
tations with the capacity to be interpreted in different ways based on
the context in which they are encountered. In order to capture the
flexibility of these semantic representations, however, we propose
that they should take shape in a way that is deeply connected with
the actual body of the agent. With this in mind, we suggest that the
connections between the environment and the mechanical architec-
ture of the agent should be as straightforward as possible, avoiding
unnecessary networks of dense, complex hidden layers. Instead of
having a multi-staged approach of first interpreting and then react-
ing to the environment, the representations of the environment can
be incorporated with the responses to the environment. Then, rather
than assigning a semantic label to the mapping from inputs to ac-
tions, we can cast perceiving, interpreting, and expressing as actions
in themselves, associated with their own affordances.
So, for instance, if a robot is learning a representation for open in
the context of a door, there could be information incorporated into
the representation regarding not only the actions learned in order to
open a door (which may consist of a sequence of learned or pro-
grammed subroutinnes), but also the various raw stimuli detected by
the robots sensors as well as any action policies associated with ad-
justing sensors. The semantic representation for open is then cast as
a vector   !open, where the features of the vector are the combinations
of states, actions, and environmental inputs associated with the door
opening event. A subsequent identification of the utterance “open”
should invoke this representation, but projected into the context in
which the utterance is encountered by way of feature weights. In
this way we hope to introduce flexibility to semantic representations
through a mechanism for projecting the representation into a partic-
ular context, and some, but not all, of the components of the robot’s
representational framework for opening doors might be transferred
to, for instance, opening packages or opening books.
The apparatus for building high-dimensional semantic representa-
tions is the subject of work in the distributional semantic paradigm,
which seeks to generate representations for words based on observa-
tions taken across large-scale textual corpora [71, 14]. The problem
with distributional semantics in the context of grounded language
learning is, of course, that the representations are generated based
on an analysis of a very large amount of textual data taken outside
of any sort of real-world environment: this is very different than the
way an embodied artificial agent encounters the world, and almost
certainly results in a very different sort of representation than what
we are after. An additional obstacle is the fact that the dimensions
of distributional semantic representations tend to be quite abstract.
These representational spaces are generally generated through either
matrix factoring applied to a large and sparse matrix of co-occurrence
statistics [21], or, more typically at present, through the opaque oper-
ations of neural networks trained on language modelling objectives
[42, 47, 48].
By mapping representations to features of the actual environment
encountered by the language-learning agent, though, the representa-
tions themselves are grounded in situations in the world. With this
set-up, an agent receiving linguistic input might identify the input
and then instantaneously project it into a subspace specified by the
current environmental context. The world, as Brooks [7] has pro-
claimed, becomes its own model, and the environment itself provides
the traction for projecting the representation into a contextually in-
terpretable subspace. This way, something of the sense of open in the
context of doors can be transferred to the literal but different contexts
of books, or shops, and then onward along the graded slope of figu-
rativeness towards the senses in which events, or communications, or
indeed minds are things that can be opened. More generally this kind
of representational architecture might provide the basis for satisfying
the embodied and embedded requirements of semantic phenomena
such as image schemas, where the embodied experience associated
with an action maps onto a linguistic representation (especially of a
preposition or phrasal verb).
There are still many decisions to be made regarding the level of
abstraction of an environmentally grounded semantic representation:
there will necessarily be mitigating layers of recurrent and convo-
lutional neural networks processing noisy raw perceptual stimuli in
time and space. By associating affordances with sensorimotor contin-
gencies, we hope to lay the groundwork for building the actions asso-
ciated with perceptions into representations themselves, rather than
constructing representations as labels for mappings between percep-
tions and actions. But for now this remains a high-level theoretical
commitment very much in need of a more thorough consideration of
how it can actually be technically applied.
5 Building Dynamically Situated Linguistic Agents
The robots employed in the research surveyed in Section 3 share
the particular property of being humanoid. This makes sense: lan-
guage is an important part of human activities, and conversely the
flexibility and compositionality evident in natural language are ar-
guably uniquely human attributes [49, 22].5 The environmental pres-
sures experienced by humans and their ancestors on an evolutionary
timescale have provided a set of physiological, cognitive, and social
conditions particularly suited to linguistic communication. On top
of that, the objective of much research involving language learning
robots is, as previously mentioned, to use entities that are human-
like at a certain level of abstraction in order to study the relationship
between features of human anatomy and language.
By the same token, though, the human body has come to fill the
niche it does over the course of a very specific and immeasurably
complex history of events spanning an immense period of time.6
There are many components of being human that feed into the na-
ture of language as observed in use, and, to return to a recurring
theme, it seems difficult at best to specify the level of abstraction at
which an artificial agent needs to be specified in order to emulate the
grounding of natural language as experienced in human form.
With this in mind, it may be necessary to delve into a consider-
ation of what Sloman has characterised as possible minds [60], a
phrase intended to encompass the idea that what characterises the
cognitive is not necessarily exclusively or indeed inherently human.
The upshot of abandoning the doubly challenging objective of engi-
neering humanlike language instantiated in a human form is, from
an engineering perspective, that language can be treated as an objec-
tive, a teleological force guiding iterations of design decisions, rather
than an emergent solution to an adaptational problem presented by a
complex and changing environment. This opens the path for explor-
ing the minimal requirements for the kind of machine we would need
in order to implement an agent that develops, in the course of its
entanglement with the world, a language.
5 The extent to which natural language is either innately or uniquely human
remains perhaps one of the most controversial topics in contemporary lin-
guistics [12, 24]; we do not intend to take a stance on the subject, aside from
to consider the real possibility of designing a language-using machine.
6 Davidson [18] has argued, by way of thought experimentation, that a word
acquires its meaning only through a personal and communal history of use;
deracinated from this history, it has no meaning at all, and is just another
material thing that happens.
Authors such as Clark [13] and Zwaan [77] have made the case
that an agent’s environment provides an essential structural compo-
nent to both cognition and language, and a natural continuation of
these ideas is the enactivist approach to cognitive science. Enactivism
embraces the idea that cognitive agents can be modelled in terms
of self-perpetuating systems at the nexus of networks of environ-
mental constraints: mindful individuals are, essentially, homeostats.
By this account, representations are emergent properties of, rather
than causal components within, systems calibrated for responding to
specific contexts within complicated and unpredictable environments
[72]. Enactivism has been explored in the context of self-organising
systems and evolutionary robotics [76, 4], but linguistic applications
remain elusive, perhaps because language is so naturally conceptu-
alised in terms of representational intentionality [58]. Cuffari et al.
[17] do, though, put forward a framework for an enactivist approach
to language, built on the foundational concept of participatory sense-
making as the basis for a process of languaging that is wrapped up in
interactions between agents and within environments.
The first component of this two-pronged enactivist framework for
language is a model of how language emerges through a series of res-
olutions of dynamic tensions that arise in the course of sense-making
in a social, which is to say interactive, setting. Each resolution gen-
erates a new pair of tensions between the individual and the social
components of the model, with this sequence of tensions and solu-
tions ultimately resulting in the production of a linguistic mode of
communication. The second component of the framework is a model
designed to capture the dynamic couplings between sense-making,
having a body, and being in the world which are the underlying com-
ponents of the system that results in the emergence of language. This
model is intended to reflect the ontogenetic component of language,
by which the physical human interaction with the world serves as
the basis for the construction of a language. Cuffari et al. describe
this ontogeny as resulting in an increasingly linguistic mode of com-
munication; for our purposes, we interpret this graded component of
the model to correspond to the introduction of semantic flexibility to
emergent linguistic representations.
Practically applied to the design of robots, this theoretical frame-
work might begin to look something like a subsumption architec-
ture [7]. The premise of these architectures is that low level systems
of constraints, instantiated in the basic circuitry of a robot, become
the operational units for higher level processes. In terms of language
learning, the low level routines might involve basic objectives for
social functionality such as avoiding collisions and conflicts (and
these routines may themselves be contingent on lower level subrou-
tines). This idea squares with Deacon’s [20] hierarchical model of
human cognition, which postulates that networks of constraints at a
particular level of abstraction become the basis for emergent attrac-
tors which in turn become constraints for further emergent properties.
Deacon, grounding his theory in the biosemiotic paradigm [34, 46],
makes a compelling argument for the way that these levels of emer-
gence eventually lead to the materialisation of representation, inten-
tional, and even teleological components of a cognitive architecture.
But on what level of abstraction do semantic representations with
the flexibility and compositionality characteristic of natural language
emerge? We would be remiss to claim to have an answer to this
question, but we propose that thinking about the design of language-
learning robots that might take a very different form than ourselves
is a good place to start. By stepping away from the constraints of the
human body and its place in its evolutionary and social niches, we
have the chance to explore the minimal conditions necessary for the
emergence of a mode of language that exhibits open-ended semantic
flexibility.
6 Conclusion
Based on a recognition of the fundamental flexibility of natural lan-
guage, we have proposed two components for a new research project
in language learning for artificial agents. The first involves the con-
struction of an architecture in which semantic labels are emergent
properties of direct connections between environment and physiog-
nomy, motivated by the idea that these type of connections will facil-
itate the contextualisation that invites and grounds semantic flexibil-
ity. The second is a call to consider the ways in which non-humanoid
agents might acquire language, a move which could allow us to fo-
cus on the basic conditions under which agent-environment entangle-
ment results in the emergence of flexible semantic representations.
Both of these positions are, as they stand, underspecified, and we
present them simply as a starting point for future research. In the
meantime, by way of a conclusion, we will explore two philosophi-
cal implications of the embedded and embodied framework that we
have outlined.
The first implication regards the broad assumption that a robotic
language facility would be in some way or another portable, either
by taking the form of software that is installed on robotic hardware or
else as an architecture that could be extrapolated from one machine
and then transferred to any number of other machines [5]. We are
pessimistic about this idea, though. If semantic representations arise
out of a deep interconnection between the actual physical architec-
ture of the robot and its environment, it is difficult to imagine how
the representations learned by one robot in one set of circumstances
would map to a different robot in a different situation. As mentioned
throughout this paper, the level of abstraction at which the critical
fusion between agent and environment occurs is ambiguous, perhaps
inextricably so given that this remains a completely open problem
in theoretical linguistics, as well; intuitively it seems likely that lan-
guage happens at many different levels. With this in mind, it is un-
realistic to expect that the combinations of basic materials, circuitry,
mechanisms, and pre-programmed routines that constitute a tabula
rasa robot, combined with the myriad environmental conditions en-
countered by a robot in the course of language-learning, will translate
smoothly from one machine to another.
The second implication pertains to what we will coin the Asimo-
vian fallacy, with reference to the three laws of robots famously laid
out in Isaac Asimov’s science fiction writing [2]. These tenets, which
take the form of commandments about robots’ actions, presume a
high-level correspondence with the robot about its goal-directed be-
haviour. What is generally left to the reader’s imagination in the orig-
inal and subsequent literature is the representational form that goals
will actually take within the cognitive architecture of a robot. We
suggest, in line with Deacon [20], that goals only come about in the
course of developing a system of intentional representations, and in-
deed as an emergent attractor of this process. If this is the case, then
it must be impossible to separate the representation of goals from the
semantic representations and underlying semiotic processes used to
communicate about goals, and so, by the time a robot can be anal-
ysed as having goals, the behaviour of the machine will be inextrica-
bly entangled with its cognitive architecture, not something that can
be isolated and modified.
This is the stuff of science fiction. More immediately, though, an
important assumption that is more or less ubiquitous to simulations
of the emergence of language through multi-agent interaction is that
the agents participating in language games are endowed with goals
that pertain to persisting in their environments. Moreover, these goals
are generally explicitly communicative: there is a presumption that
effective communication gives an agent a fitness advantage in the en-
vironment. But there is a subtle speciousness lurking in the presump-
tion that communicative goals could precede communication itself.
Having goals is an emergent property of having intentional represen-
tations, so the idea of the goal of communication can only arise in the
course of the analysis of the individual dynamic situations in which
communication happens, and of the general history of situations over
which communication evolves.
In fact, a significant consequence of the ontogenetic model of the
emergence of language presented by Cuffari et al. [17] is that the in-
dividual appears in tandem with the emergence of language through
social interaction.7 The implication here is that the very idea of an
agent is wrapped up in the same processes that lead to the emer-
gence of a system of language characterised by an openly flexible
lexicon. The conceptualisation of goals requires a process of repre-
senting things that are not present by way of a systems of interact-
ing constraints. The language of objectives is a way of talking about
emergent properties of these systems, rather than an integral causal
component of them.
There is an additional ethical ramification to the idea that robots
cannot have goals without having semantics. Bryson [8] has made a
case that humans should not build machines to which they have eth-
ical obligation: we should draw a line at developing robots with a
cognitive architecture that would compel us to consider, for instance,
the psychological comportment of the machine. This seems reason-
able enough, but in the end it is a stipulation that might be entirely
anathema to building language-using robots, or indeed other semi-
sophisticated forms of linguistic AI, in the first place. If we accept
that language proper entails a conceptual structure that necessarily
corresponds to some sort of cognitive architecture, then, by the time
we are actually talking with our devices, we have already entered
into a situation where we have no choice but to consider, at least in
a superficial or performative sense, that those mechanical systems
are cognitive entities that in turn entail ethical commitments beyond
what we would assign to a mere lump of matter. If we fail to make
this commitment, then what is presented as language use is imme-
diately relegated back to the realm of mere signalling posturing as
language.
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